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BUSINESS RECORD AUTHENTICATION AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: STATE V. HOoD, 135 OHIO ST. 3D
137 (OHIO 2012)
Nicholas F. Caprino*
I. INTRODUCTION

While many constitutional issues are complex and constantly
evolving, few concepts have seen the drastic overhaul that the
Like other
Confrontation Clause has undergone in recent years.'
revolutions in legal analysis, the Confrontation Clause revolution,
established by Crawford v. Washington, brought about unforeseen
challenges and questions that many courts were not prepared to answer.2
The Crawford test initially seemed to be fairly simple, but as fact
patterns on the margins of the rule rose to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Crawford analysis became much more complex.3 The Supreme Court
of Ohio fell victim to this complex analysis in State v. Hood.4 While
Crawford stands for the total separation of evidentiary analysis and
Confrontation Clause analysis, 5 Hood used the evidentiary rules for
business records and their authentication to find a violation of the
Confrontation Clause.6 The Ohio Attorney General and Solicitor
General submitted a motion for reconsideration in response to the faulty
analysis in Hood I, which the Supreme Court of Ohio granted.
Although Hood II slightly altered the opinion in Hood I, the court again
failed to correctly evaluate the issue and left the Confrontation Clause
hopelessly entangled with evidentiary analysis.
* Associate Member, 2012-2013 University of CincinnatiLaw Review. I would like to thank
my parents, Frank and Elise Caprino, for all the support they have given me throughout my education. I
would also like to thank my Granfather, Charlie Winans, for all of his encouragement and for providing
me with an example of a great lawyer.
1. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (state
supreme court ruled that admission of wife's statement to police was not a violation of the Confrontation
Clause, but was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court); State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010),
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (state supreme court ruled that admission of BAC report did not violate
the Confrontation Clause, but was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court).
3. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
4. See generally State v. Hood (Hoodl), 984 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2012); State v. Hood (Hood1l),
984 N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2012).
5. Crawford,541 U.S. at 61.
6. HoodI, 984 N.E.2d at 937-38; Hood!!, 984 N.E.2d at 1066.
7. See Hood!I,984 N.E.2d at 1059.
8. See Hood!, 984 N.E.2d at 937-38; HoodII, 984 N.E.2d at 1066.
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Part II of this Article provides an overview of the Confrontation
Clause and its case law development and discusses the business records
exception analysis as applied to confrontation issues. Part III discusses
the opinion in Hood I and the subsequent changes in Hood I. Part IV
discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's intended treatment of business
records under the Confrontation Clause and the way the Supreme Court
of Ohio actually applied this analysis. Part IV will also address the
potential consequences of Hood I. Finally, Part V will conclude that
both Hood I and II failed to properly apply U.S. Supreme Court
precedent and that the Supreme Court of Ohio should yet again revisit
the Hood opinions to avoid unintended consequences-in particular,
Hood II will grant a heightened constitutional standard of review for any
defendant's challenge of business record authentication. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: "In all
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."' 0 Like much of the Constitution, the
Confrontation Clause provides little guidance as to what it truly means
to give a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him," and deeper interpretation has been left to the
courts. 11
The roots of the right to confrontation can be found in ancient Roman
law and the more modem developments of English common law.12
Early common law allowed justices to directly examine witnesses in the
presence of the accused, and these practices were first codified in the
sixteenth century.' 3 The most famous instance of early witness
examination was the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.14 Lord Cobham
implicated Raleigh in a confession, and Cobham's statements were read
to the jury at Raleigh's trial.'5 Raleigh objected, declaring that
9. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael Dewine In Support of
Motion for Reconsideration of Appellee State of Ohio at 2, Hood l, 984 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2012) (No.
http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/wordpress/wpat
available
2010-2260),
content/uploads/2013/01/SG-memo.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of Amicus Curiae].
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Id., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43 (2004).
12. Crawford,541 U.S. at 43.
13. Id. (citing I J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law ofEngland, 326 (1883) and 1 & 2 Phil.
& M., c. 13 (1554)).
14. Id. at 44.
15. Id. Lord Cobham was Raleigh's alleged accomplice. Id.
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"Cobham is absolutely in the King's mercy; to excuse me cannot avail
him; by accusing me he may hope for favour."l 6 Demanding that
Corbham confront him before the jury, Raleigh argued that "[t]he Proof
of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him
speak it. Call my accuser before my face . . . ."" The judges denied
Raleigh's demands, and he was convicted and sentenced to death.' 8
After gradually realizing the injustice that Raleigh, and others like
him, had endured, English statutes were enacted to protect citizens' right
to confront witnesses against them.' 9 Courts followed suit by
"admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to
testify in person." 20 Not only did the English courts hold that the
witness was required to testify in person, but also that the defendant
would be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine that witness. 2 ' This
tradition was carried to early America and "[m]any declaration of rights
adopted around the time of the Revolution guaranteed a right of
confrontation." 22 Despite this, the right to confrontation was not
included in the proposed Federal Constitution, engendering several
objections from citizens: "[n]othing can be more essential than the cross
examining [of] witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in
question ....
[W]ritten evidence .. . [is] almost useless; it must be
frequently taken ex parte ... but very seldom leads to the proper
discovery of truth." 23 In response, the first Congress included the
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, stating that "the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." 24

16. Id. (quoting 1 D. Jardine, Criminal Trials 435 (1832)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id (quoting 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. (citing 2 How. St. Tr., at 15, 24).
19. Id. at 44-45. "One of Raleigh's trial judges later lamented that 'the justice of England has
never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh."' Id at 44 (quoting
I Jardine, Criminal Trials 435, 520 (1832)). Crawford also cites an example of statutory reform in
England's treason statutes that required the witnesses to confront the accused "'face to face' at his
arraignment. Id at 45 (citing 13 Car. 2, c. 1, §5 (1661)).
20. Id. at 45 (citing Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 770-71 (H.L. 1666)).
21. Id (citing King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (holding that a dead witness's
statement was not admissible because the defendant was not present when the examination of the
witness was taken)).
22. Id. at 48 (citing Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776); Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights § IX (1776); Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776); Maryland Declaration of Rights § XIX
(1776); North Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights Ch. I,
§ X (1777); Massachusetts Declaration of Rights § XII (1780); New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV
(1783)).
23. Id. at 49 (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 15, 1787)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 38, 42; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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1. Ohio v. Roberts: Indicia of Reliability
Interestingly enough, judicial analysis of the Confrontation Clause
begins in Ohio, where this analysis will eventually end up in Hood.
From 1980 to 2004, the Confrontation Clause was analyzed through an
"indicia of reliability" test set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ohio v.
Roberts.25
In Roberts, the prosecution sought to admit at trial a transcript of an
unavailable witness's testimony from the preliminary hearing.26 At this
preliminary hearing, the defense extensively cross-examined the
witness. 27 Although she was sent five subpoenas, this particular witness
did not appear at trial.2 8 The defense objected to admission of the
preliminary hearing transcript on the grounds that the defendant would
be denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness. 29 After a
hearing on admissibility, the court admitted the transcript. 30 The case
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, where the testimony was
found to be inadmissible, ' following a grant of certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.32
To address the issue of whether the admission of testimony from a
declarant who is not present at trial violates the Confrontation Clause,
the Court adopted the "indicia of reliability" test.33 This test intertwined
constitutional and evidentiary analyses to determine the inherent
trustworthiness of particular testimony. The Court held that testimony
from a declarant who is not available for trial may not be admitted
unless the testimony bears some indicia of reliability.34 To admit
evidence lacking indicia of reliability would violate the Sixth
Amendment.3 5 Testimony was deemed to bear indicia of reliability if
the evidence fell "within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or
illustrated a "particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness." 6 Therefore,
25. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
26. Id.at 59.
27. Id. at 58. The defendant was charged with stealing credit cards and check forgery, and the
witness was the daughter of the victims. The defense counsel's cross-examination unsuccessfully
attempted to elicit a confession from the witness that she gave the checks and credit cards to the
defendant without telling him that she took them without permission. Id.
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id. at 61 ("The [Ohio Supreme C]ourt held that the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a
preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial . . .
32. Id. at 77.
33. Id. at 66.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. Id
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if under an evidentiary analysis a proponent of evidence could show that
statements of a declarant not available for trial could be allowed through
hearsay exceptions, it would most likely follow that those statements
would not violate the Confrontation Clause.37
This analysis was rooted in the reliabilityof the particular evidence at
-38
issue:

The focus of the Court's concern has been to ensure that there "are
indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no
confrontation of the declarant," and to "afford the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." 39
Because the exceptions to hearsay are likewise rooted in reliability,
this early formulation of the Confrontation Clause allowed courts to
refer to the hearsay rules when deciding if admission of evidence
amounted to a constitutional violation. 40 In general, if the admission of
evidence was permissible according to the hearsay rules, it would not
violate the Confrontation Clause.4 '
2. The CrawfordRevolution
a. Crawford
In Crawford,the defendant allegedly stabbed a man who tried to rape
his wife. 42 The trial court admitted the wife's tape-recorded statement
describing the stabbing, despite the fact that the defense was not given
the opportunity to cross-examine the wife.4 3 The Washington Supreme
Court affirmed the admission of the recorded statement, "unanimously
concluding that, although [the] statement did not fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it bore the guarantees of trustworthiness" 44
making it admissible under Roberts.45 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and overruled Roberts in the process.46
After delving into the rich history behind the Confrontation Clause,
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id at 65-66 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 161 (1970)).
40. See id. at 66.
41. See id.
42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id. at 41 (citing State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)).
45. Id. at 40-41.
46. Id. at 68-69.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared that the Clause should
not be so conflated with the rules of evidence.4 7 Roberts held that if a
statement would fall within a hearsay exception, it would most likely
not violate the Confrontation Clause.48 Hearsay rules apply only to outof-court statements, and Justice Scalia believed that "[1]eaving the
regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would
render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most
flagrant inquisitorial practices. Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to
confront those who read Cobham's confession in court." 49 In other
words, a rule that denies defendants the ability to confront a witness
against them because the testimony is "a firmly rooted hearsay
exception" does not go far enough to uphold the Sixth Amendment.
"[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An
off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a
good candidate for exclusion under the hearsay rules, but it bears little
resemblance to the ... abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted." 1
In addition, the Court found the general notion of "reliability" to be
too unpredictable to be an appropriate standard for the right to
confrontation. 52 Although the right is not completely separate from the
notion of "reliability," the subjective determination of reliability is too
"amorphous" to fully fulfill the Confrontation Clause.53 "To be sure, the
Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 54 Justice
Scalia looked to the text of the Sixth Amendment and its history to
develop what he believed was a more structured and predictable
guarantee of the right to confront one's accuser.55
Analyzing the text of the Sixth Amendment, the Court observed that
the Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses," and a witness is one
who bears testimony. 56 ".Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.' An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. at 51.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. Cf Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added).
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 51.
Id.
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a casual remark to an acquaintance does not."57 Therefore, the question
is not whether the statement fits into a hearsay exception or has
guarantees of trustworthiness, but whether it is "testimonial" in the more
158
general sense.
The fact that a statement is testimonial does not automatically mean a
defendant is guaranteed the right to confront the witness at trial. Justice
Scalia recognized that the common law application of the confrontation
right allowed admissibility of a statement if the witness was 1)
unavailable and 2) there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Therefore the "Sixth Amendment incorporates those limitations."59 With
this analysis, the Court declared a new rule: "[t]estimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial [shall be] admitted only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine." 60
The Court's analysis of "testimonial" statements briefly addressed the
fact that certain hearsay exceptions, like business records, have
constituted valid Confrontation Clause exceptions since the time of the
Framers.61
But Justice Scalia declared that the business records
exception was not "invoked to admit testimonial statements against the
accused..... 62 Rather, business records, "by their nature were not
testimonial," and therefore could be constitutionally admitted without
the witness's availability or the opportunity for the defendant to crossexamine.
Despite the pronouncement of the new "testimonial" based rule, the
Court left "for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial."' 64 Justice Scalia only declared that the
wife's tape-recorded statement at issue was clearly testimonial, and
therefore its admission was a violation of the Confrontation Clause. 5
b. What Is Testimonial?

The Supreme Court clarified the definition of "testimonial" in Davis
v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.66 The Court consolidated these
57.
Language
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id (citations omitted) (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
(1828)).
Id at 51-52.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
Id. at 59.
Id.
at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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two cases, both involving declarants' (victims') statements about
domestic abuse. 67 In Davis, the Washington Supreme Court determined
that a 911 call from a victim of domestic abuse was not testimonial
under Crawford, so the admission of the call at trial did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. 6 8 In Hammon, the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the admission of statements made to police officers by a victim
of domestic violence. 69 The statements at issue were made after the
police officers had arrived at the scene and the victim and defendant
were separated.7 0 In both situations, the victim was unavailable to
testify at trial.7
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
Davis and reversed Hammon.72 The test to determine whether a
statement is testimonial or not depends on the objective "primary
purpose" of those statements. 73
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate there is no such ongoing emergency, and the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.74
The difference between testimonial and nontestimonial lies in the
distinction between proving "some past fact" as it happened and
"describing current circumstances requiring police assistance" as events
are happening.75 The former is testimonial, and the latter is not.76
Applied to the facts at hand, the declarant's call in Davis was about
events "as they were actually happening"77 and in response to "resolve a
present emergency." 78 The declarant in Davis "simply was not acting as
a witness; she was not testifying.",79 Because Justice Scalia considered
these types of nontestimonial statements to be just as strong as live
testimony, the confrontational problem Raleigh faced would be avoided
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 817-19.
Id. at 819.
Id.at 819-20.
Id.
Id. at 819-20. Both declarants were subpoenaed but did not show up for trial. Id.
Id.at 834.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. at 827.
See id.
Id (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 828.
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without the need for the declarant's appearance at trial or a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.8 0 To the contrary, the statements in
Hammon had the primary purpose of investigation of a possible crime
and were therefore "inherently testimonial."8
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court, again through Justice

Scalia, explained why business records were not testimonial: "[b]usiness
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule, but
because-having been created for the administration of an entity's
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at
trial .... "8 2 The Court then held that drug lab analysis certificates were
not business records under the Confrontation Clause and were therefore
testimonial.83
c. Michigan v. Bryant
In the early morning of April 29, 2001 in Detroit Michigan, Anthony
Covington suffered a gunshot wound.84 Officers found Covington lying
on the ground in a gas station parking lot, and with some difficulty,
Covington told the officers that "Rick" had shot him.8 5 "Rick" was
Richard Bryant who had allegedly shot Covington after a conversation
between the two at Bryant's house.86 Covington spoke with police for
about five to ten minutes before the emergency medical vehicles arrived,
and Covington died soon after.87
The Bryant trial occurred before the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
Crawford and Davis.88 At trial, the police officers testified to the
conversation with Covington before he died. 89 A jury convicted Bryant
of murder, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, but the
Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the recently issued Davis decision. 90 The Michigan Court of Appeals
again affirmed the conviction on the finding that Covington's statements
were not testimonial, and the Michigan Supreme Court reversed,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See generally id.at 822.
Id.at 830.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
Id. at 311, 320.
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.atll50-51.
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ordering a new trial.9 ' The Michigan Supreme Court held that
Covington's statements were testimonial because "the 'primary purpose'
of the questioning was to establish the facts of an event that had already
occurred," and not to "enable police to meet an ongoing emergency." 92
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Michigan
Supreme Court on the basis that Covington's declaration that Rick shot
him was not testimonial.93 Bryant provided the Court an opportunity to
elaborate on the "ongoing emergency" concept created in Davis.94
Bryant focused on all of the factors and circumstances surrounding the
statements to determine what the primary purpose of the statements
were, and therefore whether they were testimonial. 95 Discussing the
factors to consider, Bryant declared that "[i]n making the primary
purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify
some statements as reliable, will be relevant."#9 For example, "[t]his
logic is not unlike that justifying the excited utterance exception in
hearsay law." 97 Despite seemingly reverting back to Roberts's reliance
on evidentiary standards to determine whether a statement bears indicia
of reliability to be allowed under the Confrontation Clause, the Bryant
Court claimed to fully rely on Crawford and Davis for the basis of its
holding.98
The Bryant majority opinion, written by Justice Sotomayor, 99 was met
with a vehement dissent by Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford and
Davis.100 Justice Scalia saw Bryant as a drastic break from Crawford
and its progeny, and perhaps rightfully so.' 0 ' As Justice Scalia saw it,
Bryant took a step from Crawfordback to Roberts by looking at firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions to determine violations of the Confrontation
Clause. 0 2 While Crawford sought to rely solely on whether the
evidence was testimonial, rather than on the evidence's reliability,
Bryant considered reliability factors to determine if the statement was

91. Id. at 1151.
92. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Mich. 2009)).
93. Id. at 1167.
94. Id. at 1156.
95. See generally id. at 1157-60.
96. Id. at1155.
97. Id. at 1157.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1149.
100. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817
(2006). Despite Justice Scalia's dissent, Bryant claimed to follow the reasoning of Davis. Bryant, 131
S. Ct. at 1156 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
101. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See generally Jason Widdison, Comment, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of Roberts and the
Return ofReliability, 47 GONZ. L. REv. 219 (2011).
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testimonial, resurrecting the Roberts reliability analysis.1 03
The current Confrontation Clause analysis lies in a state of limbo
between Crawford's and Roberts's.1" In Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that blood alcohol
analyses were testimonial. Although the majority cited Bryant, it did
not make any indication that it took evidentiary hearsay standards into
account when determining the primary purpose of the blood alcohol
tests. os Justice Sotomayor, the author of Bryant, filed a concurrence to
emphasize the idea that the hearsay rules should have a bearing on the
primary purpose of the tests.106 The current split in views among the
Justices leaves the future of the Confrontation Clause somewhat
tenuous, 0 7 but at least for now, Crawford and Melendez-Diaz are the
law.' 08
B. Business Records
Traditionally, business records have been granted exceptions to
typical evidentiary analysis in the areas of hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause.1 09 The logic behind granting an exception for business records
from the bar against hearsay is different from the logic behind granting
an exception to the Confrontation Clause constraints. 1o For this reason,
103. See generally id.
104. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
105. See id. at 2713.
106. Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
107. The split among the Justices is most clear in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012),
where a plurality of four justices, led by Justice Samuel Alito, ruled that DNA identification tests taken
before the identity of the defendant was known were not testimonial, and therefore the defendant had no
constitutional right to confront the lab technician who ran the initial test. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2227-28 (2012). Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, but on wholly different grounds. Justice
Thomas believes that only formalized statements (affidavit or notarized document) are testimonial, and
because the tests were not formalized, they were not subject to confrontation. Id at 2256, 2260
(Thomas, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor,
dissented. Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting). These Justices adhered to the strict Confrontation Clause
standard set by Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming to find that the defendant should have been
given the opportunity to confront the lab technician of the initial DNA test. Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). Although this is an important case in the development of the Confrontation Clause, it will
not be discussed in this note for two reasons. First, arguably, Williams can only be applied to stateproduced lab reports that are used for an investigation, and not general business records. Second, as
Justice Kagan points out, because of the plurality split, it is likely that Williams holds little precedential
value. Id at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
108. See generally Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (using Crawford and Melendez-Diaz as support
throughout the opinion).
109. See, e.g., OHIO EVID. R. 803(6); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,56 (2004).
110. Compare OHIO EVID. R. 803(6) staff notes (explaining that business records are reliable
because a business cannot function without accurate records), with Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (explaining that business records are not subject to the Confrontation Clause
because they are not testimonial).
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this Note discusses business records in each arena separately.
1. Business Records Exception in Hearsay
Hearsay in the Ohio Evidence Rules is defined as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and is
generally inadmissible."' The business records exception to the hearsay
rule (Ohio Evidence Rule 803(6)) allows the admission of evidence
"even though the declarant is available as a witness."" 2 The
"memorandum, report, record, or data compilation" must have been
"kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity" to fall
under the business records exception and must be authenticated as
such.' ' The staff notes to Rule 803(6) illustrate that this exception has
a "guaranty of trustworthiness" derived from "the fact that records made
in the ordinary course of business by employees under an obligation to
make such records will be accurate because business cannot, as a matter
of course, function without accurate records."' 14
2. Confrontation Clause Exception
Crawford first identified the business records exception under the
Confrontation Clause, but made clear that this exception does not have
the same underpinnings as the business records exception to hearsay.'1s
In Crawford,Justice Scalia admits that it cannot be denied that the early
implementation of the Confrontation Clause did indeed recognize an
exception for business records, "[b]ut there is scant evidence that
exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the
accused in a criminalcase."ll 6 Business records were treated differently
111. OHIO EVID. R. 801(C); see also OHIO EVID. R. 802.
112. OHIO EvD. R. 803(6).
113. OHIO EvID. R. 803(6) (business records exception); see also OHIO EVID. R. 901(A)
(authentication requirement). OHIO EVID. R. 803(6) reads:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness or as provided by Rule 901(B)(10), unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
114. OHIO EvID. R. 803(6) staff notes.
115. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
116. Id
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under the Confrontation Clause not because they were also an exception
to hearsay, nor because they were reliable.!17 Rather, the business
records were not subject to confrontation analysis because they "by their
nature were not testimonial. . . .""' Rather than describing business

records as an exception to the Confrontation Clause, a more accurate
explanation would be that business records are not subject to
Confrontation Clause violations because they are, by their nature,
nontestimonial.119
Melendez-Diaz expounded on this point.120 Business records are
admissible without requiring confrontation "not because they qualify
under an exception to the hearsay rule," but because they were created
to carry out the affairs of an entity and "not for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact at trial . . . ., 12 1 To put it in the
simplest terms, business records are an exception to hearsay because
they are trustworthy and reliable,122 and their admission will not violate
the Confrontation Clause because they were not prepared to prove a fact
at trial.123 These justifications often overlap, increasing the risk that
courts will mistakenly conflate these analyses.124
III. STATE V.HOOD
A. Hood I
A house party in Cleveland, Ohio was wrapping up at about 5:00 a.m.
in January 2009 when the homeowners and guests encountered four
masked, armed men.125 The masked men held the victims at gunpoint
and ordered them to strip and hand over cell phones and money.1 26 The
robbers quickly left, and the victims heard gunshots immediately
after.127 One of the robbers, Peet, was found dead in a nearby yard, and
local officers apprehended two other co-conspirators, Hood and Hill.128
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
Id.
See id.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).

121. Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See OHIO EVID. R. 803(6) staff notes.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
See id.
HoodII, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1059-60 (Ohio 2012).
Id. at 1060.

127. Id.
128. Id. One co-conspirator was identified by several of the victims based on his distinctive coat.
Id. The fourth robber was Davis, and the opinion does not indicate how he was apprehended. See
generally id. at 1060-61.
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Hill eventually testified against Hood, explaining the group's plan and
describing an altercation taking place between Hood and Peet
immediately after the heist, which allegedly resulted in Peet's murder.129
At trial, the state sought to admit phone records that purported to
show cell phone traffic between the co-conspirators around the time in
question, including "a call from one of the stolen cell phones to Hill's
phone."130 The prosecution relied on the business records exception to
hearsay to admit the testimony and attempted to authenticate the records
by introducing testimony describing the subpoena process by the
detective who obtained the records.131 The defense objected on the
grounds of improper authentication, and the court responded by
requiring the state to provide another witness to authenticate the
records.132 The state brought a different detective to testify to his
experience with the geolocation of cell phones based on cell-tower
data.133 Despite the trial court's "gut reaction ... to subpoena Verizon"
to further authenticate the records, it admitted them based on the
detectives' testimony.134
The jury convicted Hood of murder,
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and burglary.' 3 5
Hood appealed the conviction on two grounds. First, the defense
argued that cell phone records were not admissible as business records
without proper authentication.' 36
Second, the admission of the
unauthenticated cell phone records under the business records exception
violated the Confrontation Clause.137 The intermediate appellate court
affirmed the trial court judgment and conviction.' 3 8
Hood I was first decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio on December
3, 2012.19 In affirming the appellate and trial courts, the court found
that the admission of the records violated the rules of evidence and were
unconstitutional, but the error was harmless.140 The court held that cell
phone records were hearsay because they were "statements ... offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' 4 1 The records
may have qualified under the business records exception to the hearsay
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061-62.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1063-64.
Hood l, 984 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2012).
Id. at 937-39.
Id. at 937 (quoting OHIO EVID. R. 801(C)).
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rule if they had been properly authenticated, but the court found that
"there was simply no foundation laid by the custodian of the record or
by any other qualified witness."l 42 The trial court should have followed
its gut and required the state to subpoena Verizon to authenticate the
records.143
On the Confrontation Clause issue, the court initially found that the
cell phone records were nontestimonial based on Melendez-Diaz, and
therefore "the Confrontation Clause [did] not affect their
admissibility."'" But in an unusual twist, the court relied on preRoberts decisions to declare that "[a] hearsay violation itself violates the
Confrontation Clause, and thus requires a heightened harmless-error
analysis." 45 Heightened harmless-error analysis for constitutional
violations requires de novo review and harmlessness, which is
determined beyond a reasonable doubt. 146 This is a stricter standard
than an evidentiary violation, which only requires abuse of discretion
review and simple harmlessness (not beyond a reasonable doubt).147
B. Motionsfor Reconsideration

The Attorney General and Solicitor General submitted motions for
reconsideration expressing concern that Confrontation Clause analysis
was improperly comingled with evidentiary analysis in Hood 1.148 Most
importantly, the Attorney General and Solicitor General were concerned
with the level of review that a constitutional analysis would impose on
all hearsay challenges if Hood I were to prevail. According to Hood I,
because every hearsay violation is inherently a constitutional violation,
appeals of hearsay violations will be afforded the constitutional
violation, de novo, standard of review: heightened harmless-error
analysis, also known as harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.149
This is opposed to the lower standard of review that is afforded simple
evidentiary violations: abuse of discretion that is tempered by
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The Court cited State v. Johnson, 643 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ohio 1994), from 1994, which
explicitly implicated the "indicia of reliability" test supposedly abandoned in Crawford. Id. at 937-38
(quoting State v. Johnson, 643 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ohio 1994)).
146. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 2.
147. Id. at 6.
148. Motion for Reconsideration at 1, Hood I, 984 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2010-2260)
available at http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Hood-statesmotion.pdf [hereinafter Motion for Reconsideration]; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at
I.
149. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 148, at 4-5; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra
note 9, at 5.
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harmlessness, also known as simple harmlessness review. 5 0
The Solicitor General mapped out the specific changes that the court
should make in HoodLJ51 First, the Solicitor General suggested that the
opinion be changed so that whether a statement is testimonial is not
determined by proper authentication. 152 He also suggested that the court
remove the holding that a hearsay violation itself violates the
Confrontation Clause and the analysis that followed.153 Finally, the
Solicitor General asked that any reference to heightened harmless-error
review and "beyond a reasonable" doubt be removed. 154
C. Hood II
Although the court reconsidered the case, and vacated parts of Hood
I, it did not go as far as the Attorney General and Solicitor General
would have liked.155 The court altered only one paragraph, and omitted
reference to pre-Crawfordcases that relied on the Roberts's "indicia of
reliability" test. 156 However, the Supreme Court of Ohio maintained the
heightened harmlessness as to constitutional analysis and rather than
declaring that hearsay violations are inherently constitutional violations,
it stated that it was the unauthenticatednature of the cell phone records
that gave rise to the constitutional violation.157 "Thus, the cell-phone
records ... were not authenticated as business records, and that fact
affect[ed] their status in regard to the Confrontation Clause. If the
records had been authenticated, we could be sure that they were not
testimonial....". Therefore, the court maintained the same standard
of review as Hood I and sustained the court's prior affirmance of the
conviction based on the harmlessness of the error.' 59
IV. DiscussioN

While Hood II changed some of the incorrect holdings of Hood I, it
did not go far enough and left Ohio with an inadequate standard to
review Confrontation Clause issues. First, Hood II conflated evidentiary
analysis with confrontation analysis and did not recognize that a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 148, at 4-5.
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 7.
Id.
Id
Id
Id. See also Hood II, 984 N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2012).
Hood II, 984 N.E.2d at 1066; Hood l, 984 N.E.2d 929, 937-38 (Ohio 2012).
Hood II, 984 N.E.2d at 1066-67.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1066-67.
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business record, by its nature, is not testimonial and cannot violate the
Confrontation Clause.'6 0 The court could have cited Bryant to at least
partially explain its holding in Hood II but rather chose to adopt an
incorrect understanding of Crawford.'6 1 In addition, the Supreme Court
of Ohio did not recognize or explain the new burdens this would place
on the state by subjecting every defendants' challenge of authentication
to a heightened standard of review.1 62 Finally, Hood II hinders the
presentation of appropriate evidence to the trier of fact, making it more
difficult for the judge or jury to ascertain the truth to reach a "legitimate
verdict." 63
A. Under Crawford, the StandardIs Whether the Statement Is
Testimonial, Not Reliable

Justice Scalia used the history behind the Sixth Amendment to find
that the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with whether a
statement is testimonial, not whether a statement is reliable.164 "[T]he
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees
specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable
evidence.. . ."l

Evidentiary analysis, on the other hand, is very much

concerned with reliability of evidence as a prerequisite for admission.' 66
Therefore, the question of evidentiary admissibility under the rules of
hearsay and the question of admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause should be wholly separate.1 67 There may be a few overlapping
factors used to determine reliability under evidence and the primary
purpose of the statement under the Confrontation Clause, but the answer
to such a question in an evidentiary analysis should not affect the
160. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
161. See HoodlI,984 N.E.2d at 1066-67.
162. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 5-6.
163. See Ian Dennis, The Right to Confront Witnesses: Meanings, Myths, and Human Rights, 4
CRIM. L. REv. 255, 259 (2010) ("[T]he right to confrontation can be founded on the defendant's core
right against a factually inaccurate verdict.").
164. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
165. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
166. The exceptions to the rules of hearsay are exceptions mainly because of their inherent
trustworthiness or reliability. See, e.g., OHIO EvID. R. 803(1), staff notes (Present sense impression:
"[t]he circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness is derived from the fact that the statement is
contemporaneous and there is little risk of faulty recollection .... ); OHIO EviD. R. 803(2), staff notes
(Excited Utterance: "[t]his exception derives its guaranty of trustworthiness from the fact that declarant
is under such state of emotional shock that his reflective processes have been stilled. Therefore,
statements made under these circumstances are not likely to be fabricated."); OHIO EVID. R. 803(5), staff
notes (Recorded recollection: "[t]he exception gathers its circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness
from the fact that the person having made the statement is on the witness stand subject to oath, crossexamination and demeanor evaluation.").
167. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 61.
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Confrontation Clause analysis.' 6 8 For example, a court may consider the
state of mind of the declarant to decide if a statement falls under the
excited utterance exception to hearsay because this helps determine its
level of reliability.' 69 When the court meets the confrontation issue, it
may again consider the state of mind of the declarant at the time the
statement was made. The difference here is that the court does not
consider what bearing that state of mind has on the reliability of the
statement.o7 0 Rather, the court only asks what the primary purpose of
the statement was: to state what is happening or to memorialize past
events for potential use at trial.17 1
This same distinction is consistent between the business records
exception to the hearsay rule and the business records treatment under
the Confrontation Clause.1 72 Again, the hearsay exception is in place to
allow for excluded hearsay evidence based on its reliability,173 but the
Confrontation Clause is only concerned with whether the statement is
testimonial.174 The Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner," 75 that
is, through confrontation. 76
Business record treatment under the Confrontation Clause is not
intertwined with the reliability analysis of the hearsay rule, "but
because-having been created for the administration of an entity's
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at
trial-[business records] are not testimonial." 1 Hood I completely
ignored this U.S. Supreme Court holding by using pre-Crawfordcases
to support the mistaken idea that "[a] hearsay violation itself violates the
Hood II partially corrected this by
Confrontation Clause ... .."
removing the concept that a hearsay violation is a constitutional
violation, but then repeated the mistake by replacing it with the concept
that nonauthentication affects the status of business records under the

168. See id.
169. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 524 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ohio 1988) (admitting hearsay because it
was an excited utterance under OHIO EVID. R. 803(2)). Hearsay that is an excited utterance is allowed
because it does "not allow the declarant a meaningful opportunity to reflect on statements regarding the
event." Id. As a result, "the chance that the statement is fabricated, or distorted due to poor memory, is
greatly reduced." Id.
170. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 61.
171. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
172. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
173. Ol;3 EvID. R. 803(6) staff notes.
174. gee Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
175. Cravford,541 U.S. at 61.
176. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
177. Id.
178. Hoodl, 984 N.E.2d 929, 937 (Ohio 2012).
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Confrontation Clause.179
B. The Supreme Court of Ohio InappropriatelyUsed Authentication
Relying on evidentiary authentication rather than hearsay in general
does little to curb the issue of mixing evidentiary and confrontation
analysis.so The rule of authentication is a rule of evidence, and it
follows that it is a rule rooted in reliability.'
Under the rules of
evidence, a business record is an exception to hearsay because of its
trustworthiness, and authentication is required to ascertain the
trustworthiness.182 Under a Crawford analysis, authentication should
have no bearing on whether the evidence is testimonial.183 Although
confrontation of the custodian of a business record is a method to
determine if the record is reliable, reliability does not determine if that
record is testimonial and therefore subject to confrontation.184 Business
records "are comprised of lists of facts, without opinion or
interpretation,"s and it follows that they "are not prepared for litigation
and are thus not testimonial .... " The fact that business records are
not testimonial in nature is the end of the confrontation analysis. 8 7
Hood I and Hood II agreed, at least initially, that the cell phone
records at issue were business records and therefore not testimonial. 8 8
But the final holding that the nonauthenticated nature of the records
"affect[ed] their status in regard to the Confrontation Clause"
contradicted the initial holding and the most basic understanding of
Crawford.189 The court implicitly held that nontestimonial evidence
becomes testimonial if it violates the rules of evidence.190 Not only is
there no precedent for this concept, but it has no basis in the Supreme
Court's development of the Confrontation Clause."' While Crawford
does not specifically address authentication, it gives no indication that a
business record can be transformed into a testimonial statement by any
179. Hood II, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
180. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
181. OHIoEVID.R.901.
182. OHIo EVID. R. 803(6) staff notes; see also OHIO EVID.R. 901.
183. State v. Edwards, 837 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ohio 2005) ("The Rules of Evidence, however, are
not coextensive with constitutional requirements."); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61
(2004).
184. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 61.
185. Motion for Reconsideration, supranote 148, at 2.
186. Hood II, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1065-66 (Ohio 2012).
187. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
188. Hoodl, 984 N.E.2d 929, 936-37 (Ohio 2012); Hood!I,984 N.E.2d at 1065.
189. Hood!I,984 N.E.2d at 1066; see also Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
190. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 1.
191. See generally Crawford,541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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means, let alone authentication.1 92 Business records are "by their
nature .. . not testimonial"1 93 because they "hav[e] been created for the
administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of
In Hood, the cell
establishing or proving some fact at trial. ...
phone records were exactly that: prepared for Verizon's business affairs
and not to be used at trial.195 No precedent indicates that the evidentiary
authentication standard has any effect on this constitutional analysis, and
the Supreme Court of Ohio may have indeed recognized that fact, as it
did not cite to any authority when it declared that nonauthentication
affects a business record's status under the Confrontation Clause.' 96
The authentication process within the evidence rule ensures that
business records falling under the hearsay exception are sufficiently
reliable to pass the hearsay rule.197 The authentication process is not
designed to establish if the records are testimonial. Because cell phones
records are created for the administration of business affairs, they are
definitively nontestimonial on their face.' 98 Requiring authentication of
the cell phone records in Hood serves the goals of evidence, but not the
goals of the Confrontation Clause as they were described in
Crawford.199 While authentication can be a legitimate requirement
under hearsay, requiring authentication for confrontation purposes
places an undue burden on the state without serving any constitutional
purpose.
At least to some extent, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized Hood
I's inconsistency with Crawford when it reconsidered the case at the
request of the Attorney General and Solicitor General. 200 Nonetheless,
the court gave no reasons for not accepting most of the Solicitor
General's specific proposals, and gave no reason or support for the
adoption of the new rule that authentication affects Confrontation
Clause admissibility.2 0'
The court could have adopted the Solicitor General's suggestions and
still sustained the conviction.202 In fact, it would have been easier to
sustain because the standard of review of the trial court's error would be
lowered from the constitutional de novo standard considering
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 56.
Id.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
See Hood l, 984 N.E.2d 929, 932-33 (Ohio 2012).
See Hood II, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
See OHIO EvID. R. 803(6), staff notes.
See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
See generally Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004).
Hood l, 984 N.E.2d at 1059.
Id at 1066.
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 7.
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harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt to an abuse of discretion that
considers simple harmlessness. 203 The court should have simply found
that the admission of the business records violated the hearsay rules by
not being properly authenticated as a business record, and therefore not
availing itself of the business records exception. The court did not have
to reach the constitutional question, and perhaps should not have, even if
it was correctly applied. This "avoidance doctrine" was first laid out in
a concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis where he declared that, "[t]he
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also resent some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of."2 The U.S. Supreme Court has
solidified the avoidance doctrine by recognizing that the "fundamental
and long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts
avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of

deciding them." 205

In Hood II, the Supreme Court of Ohio could have stopped after it
found the authentication error, which would have subjected the appeal to
the lower harmlessness standard of review and would have allowed it to
reach the same verdict.2 06 This would have still maintained the integrity
of the necessity to authenticate evidence without upsetting the just
verdict. 207 Instead, the court chose to reach the constitutional issue,
despite the fact that its analysis would not affect the verdict. As a result,
the court distorted Confrontation Clause analysis and unnecessarily
increased the burden on the state at every appeal of criminal
authentication issues.208
C. How the Supreme Court of Ohio Could Have JustifiedIts Opinion
Through Bryant
As explained above, the Supreme Court of Ohio gave no authority for
its holding that authentication of business records "affects their status in
regards to the Confrontation Clause." 209 In addition, it gave no
explanation of why it would not adopt the Attorney General or Solicitor
General's recommendations. 210 The court devotes only four sentences

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 2.
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,445 (1988).
See Motion for Reconsideration, supranote 148, at 5.
Id. at 5.
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
SeeHoodII, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
See id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 9

584

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

to justify the holding.2 1 1 If the court felt so strongly about maintaining
the heightened constitutional review, it should have at least stretched
some precedent to validate its opinion, and perhaps could have.
Bryant could have explained the court's reliance on the totality of
circumstances and its use of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. 212 Much
to Justice Scalia's chagrin, 2 13 Bryant looked at all of the circumstances
surrounding the declarant's dying statement to determine whether it was
testimonial.2 14 In particular, Bryant used hearsay's "excited utterance"
analysis to explain why such statements are more reliable and therefore
nontestimonial.2 15
Although Bryant conflates evidentiary and
confrontation analysis, the majority does not purport to break from
Crawford.21 6 As a result, the Confrontation Clause analysis hangs in
limbo between Crawford and Roberts without a clear consensus on how
to define testimonial.2 17
The Supreme Court of Ohio could have used Bryant and this state of
limbo to solidify its holding, but the court did not cite to Bryant.2 18 For
Supreme Court support, Hood II only cited to Crawford and MelendezDiaz,2 19 both of which unequivocally prohibit the conflation of
evidentiary and confrontation analysis. 220 Specifically, the court could
have cited Bryant's reference to the excited utterance rule and the idea
that to determine a statement's primary purpose "standard rules of
hearsay ... will be relevant." 221 While it may have been a stretch to
compare the dying declaration of Covington in Bryant to Verizon's cell
phone records, 222 it would have made slightly more sense than the Hood
II opinion as it stands.22 3 At least its confusion of evidentiary and
confrontation analysis would be loosely rooted in precedent, rather than

211. See id.
212. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155, 1157 (2011).
213. See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1156.
215. Id. at 1157.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011) (holding that blood
alcohol analysis was testimonial and therefore subject to confrontation). Justice Sotomayor filed a
concurring opinion where she reasserted the contention made in Bryant that '" [i]n making the primary
purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay . . . will be relevant."' Id. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155).
218. See generally HoodII, 984 N.E.2d 1057 (Ohio 2012).
219. Id. at 1064-65. The Court did cite to Bullcoming, but only to distinguish the present case,
not for support. Id. at 1065.
220. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 324(2009).
221. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1143, 1155.
222. See id at 1150.
223. See generally Hood II, 984 N.E.2d at 1066.
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pulled out of thin air.
Although applying Bryant may have provided more support for Hood
II and illustrated some rationale for the holding, using Bryant would still
not have solved Hood II's fatal mistake. At the very most, applying
Bryant would only serve as a weak and tenuous citation of authority.
The strictest application of Bryant only allows its application to dying
declarations or excited utterances, which would clearly not apply to the
business records at issue in Hood.224 A more generous understanding of
Bryant would still not suffice. On the most general level, Bryant applies
to cases where the "primary purpose" of a declarant's statement is at
issue.22 5 Is the primary purpose to establish a fact that already occurred
or to meet an ongoing emergency? 226 The business records in Hood
were without question intended to establish a fact that already happened
(i.e., who made what cell phone calls when),22 7 but they were not
testimonial because business records are by nature nontestimonial.2 28
Because their primary purpose is clearly "for the administration of an
entity's affairs," there is no question as to their admissibility, at least on
constitutional grounds. 229 Therefore, the Bryant standard is not
necessary to analyze the records and cannot be legitimately used to
conflate the evidentiary authentication standard with the Confrontation
Clause. Using Bryant may have helped Hood IPs audience understand
the opinion's reasoning, but citing Bryant would still not go far enough
to fully correct Hood Il's flawed Confrontation Clause analysis.
D. Policy Considerations
1. Every Authentication Challenge Will Be Met with Heightened
Review
If Hood I was not reconsidered, every hearsay consideration on
appeal would have to undergo a heightened standard of scrutiny. 230 This
leads to two consequences. "First, courts would have to review hearsay
determinations de novo, rather than for an abuse of discretion ....
Second, if a hearsay error is also a confrontation problem, then the
admission of hearsay will always trigger the 'heightened harmless-error

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.
Id at1151.
Id
Hood II, 984 N.E.2d at 1061-62.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
Id.
Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
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analysis' reserved for constitutional errors." 23 1 Hood II only narrowed
the application of these inappropriate results. Rather than subjecting all
hearsay violations to de novo and heightened harmless-error analysis,
only authentication violations will warrant the higher review. 23 2 This
result is still incorrect, as the Supreme Court of Ohio "has long reviewed
a trial court's evidentiary determinations only for abuse of
discretion." 233 Even when applied to this specific issue-authentication
of business records-courts have applied the abuse of discretion
standard of review. 234
Although Hood II did narrow the constitutional application from
hearsay to authentication, the result is still inappropriate and will lead to
disastrous practical results. 235 Now the bar will be significantly lowered
for defendants to succeed on authentication challenges. 23 6 While
"Hood's conviction can withstand even this heightened
standard,... that will not be true of every conviction." 237 Defendants
who challenge authentication issues at trial could successfully overturn
their convictions if the state is not able to show harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 38 Convictions would be overturned or require retrial
simply because a business record is not properly authenticated. That is
not to say that the authentication of business records should be
disregarded or taken lightly at trial. Rather, the protections ensuring that
business records are properly authenticated have already been
established under the abuse of discretion review.2 39 Setting the standard
for authentication at abuse of discretion and harmlessness illustrates that
while courts believe that authentication is important, it should not
operate to overturn convictions unless absolutely necessary. 240 Hood II
allows authentication to control the outcome of many criminal trials on
appeal much more than precedent allows, and without proper

231. Id.
232. See id; Hood II, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
233. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6 (citing State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904,
921-22 (Ohio 2001)).
234. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6 (citing State v. Taylor, No. 98107, 2012
WL 5878806, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. Corder, 969 N.E.2d 787, 790-91 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2012); State v. Wiley, No. 2011-CA-8, 2012 WL 443977, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2012);
State v. Barton, No. CA2005-03-036, 2007 WL 731409, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2007)).
235. See Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 148, at 5-6; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae,
supranote 9, at 6.
236. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
237. Id
238. Id
239. See, e.g., Taylor, 2012 WL 5878806, at *3-4; Corder, 969 N.E.2d at 790-91; Wiley, 2012
WL 443977, at *3; Barton, 2007 WL 731409, at *10.
240. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supranote 9, at 6.
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-241
explanation or authority.
From the Hood II opinion it is not even clear that defendants will be
required to allege a constitutional violation.2 42 The holding that "the
cell-phone records in this case were not authenticated as business
records, and that fact affects their status under the Confrontation
Clause," seems to imply that simply challenging the authentication will
warrant constitutional review, even if the specific constitutional
violation is not alleged.24 3 Regardless of the interpretation, lower courts
are sure to struggle in appropriately applying Hood II due to its lack of
analysis and guidance.

2. Hood II Runs Against the General Rule Favoring Admissibility of
Evidence and Accurate Verdicts
While there is no policy in favor of admissibility when the
Confrontation Clause is concerned, the rules of evidence seek to admit
probative evidence when it is not overly prejudicial to assist the trier of
fact to a proper outcome. 244 As discussed above, hearsay and
authentication are solely evidentiary issues and should have no bearing
on Confrontation Clause admissibility. 245 By making authentication a
constitutional issue, Hood II denies the underlying policy favoring
admission of relevant evidence.24 6 Placing a constitutional standard of
scrutiny may tip the balance too far in favor of the right to confrontation
and against the general rule of admitting evidence. Courts must be
careful to not restrict the flow of accurate evidence to the jury to the
extent that it will hinder just verdicts, and Hood II ignores this concern.
First, prosecutors may think twice before presenting certain business
records after Hood II, knowing a defendant's objection on the issue will
lead to an appeal on constitutional error, not merely evidentiary error. 247
This could deprive juries of perfectly reliable and probative evidence
that could help them draw an inference towards a defendant's guilt or
innocence. As Melendez-Diaz made clear, business records are "created
for the administration of... affairs and not for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact at trial," which can make the records
all the more useful in determining guilt. 248 The confrontation has been
241. See generally HoodII,984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
242. See id
243. Id.
244. See generally OHIO EVID. R. 401, 403.
245. See supra Part IV.A-B.
246. See generally Hood II, 984 N.E.2d at 1066.
247. See generally Motion for Reconsideration, supranote 148, at 5-6; Memorandum of Amicus
Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
248. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). Keep in mind that this
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described as "founded on the defendant's core right against a factually
inaccurate verdict." 249 The Melendez-Diaz standard demonstrates that
business records, by their nature, will facilitate accurate verdicts. 250 By
placing a constitutional burden on business records, courts will
inadvertently hinder their admission, potentially resulting in less
accurate verdicts and counteracting the very foundation of the
Confrontation Clause. Hood H takes the fateful step in this direction
and the court should again reconsider the case to avoid placing a
heightened standard of review on the authentication of business records.
V. CONCLUSION

Despite reconsidering Hood I, the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to
fully remedy its past mistakes. Hood I improperly concluded that "[a]
hearsay violation itself violates the Confrontation Clause," 251 and Hood
H only transforms the mistake to a different one by holding that
evidentiary authentication affects business records' status under the
Confrontation Clause.2 52 While the business records exception to
hearsay is rooted in reliability, 2 53 admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause is only based on whether a statement is testimonial.25 4 That is,
the Sixth Amendment "commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed" by the testimonial nature of the statement.25 5
The Hood cases initially and properly held that business records were
nontestimonial, but Hood II then implicitly transformed the business
record at issue into a nontestimonial statement by the nature of the
authentication.256 Because authentication is rooted in the reliability of
evidence, this improperly conflates evidentiary and confrontation
analysis.2 57
In addition, Hood II drastically increased the burden on the state by
lowering the bar for defendants to challenge convictions where
authentication issues were present at trial.258 Because Hood H
characterization in Melendez-Diaz was not meant to illustrate "reliability," but that business records are
nontestimonial. The same characteristics also happen to make business records more reliable, but that is
not why the Confrontation Clause does not bar their admission. See id.
249. Dennis, supra note 163, at 259.
250. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
251. HoodI, 984 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Ohio 2012).
252. Hood!I, 984 N.E.2d 1057, 1066 (Ohio 2012).
253. OHIo EVID. R. 803(6) staff notes.
254. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
255. Id. at 61.
256. Hood!!, 984 N.E.2d at 1066.
257. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009).
258. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
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transforms authentication issues into constitutional questions on appeal,
appellate courts are to undergo a more heightened standard of review
than they would for a simple evidentiary error. 259 Finally, by
transforming an evidentiary standard to a constitutional one, the court
deprived the authentication rule of the underlying policy of evidence law
that leans in favor of admissibility. 2 60 While these outcomes did not
affect the conviction of Hood, this "will not be true of every

conviction. 26 1

259. Id. at 6.
260. See generally OHIo EVID. R. 402 (allowing any admissible relevant evidence).
261. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, supra note 9, at 6.
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